Normative reference as a normative question

I am currently writing another paper on metasemantic challenges to normative naturalism. This paper is largely critical: I examine various non-expressivist versions of naturalism and argue that they cannot fully make good on the intelligibility of radical normative disagreement and the objectivity of normative truths. At the end of the paper, I defend again a quasi-naturalist approach to these issues.

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Metasemantics for soft naturalists

As I mentioned in an earlier post, one of my working papers examines two epistemological challenges to normative realism and argues that a certain kind of naturalism can successfully address these challenges while avoiding the problems faced by other versions of realism. While that previous blog post focused on quasi-naturalism, these epistemological advantages can be attributed more generally to a family of views that I call soft naturalism.

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The epistemological benefits of quasi-naturalism

I am currently exploring the philosophical benefits of normative quasi-naturalism, a view that combines expressivism about normative discourse with a naturalist metaphysics of normativity in a deflationary framework. This view is largely inspired by Allan Gibbard’s discussion of naturalism in Thinking How to Live (2003). One of my working hypotheses is that quasi-naturalism can successfully deal with important epistemological challenges to normative realism, while avoiding problems faced by other naturalist views and by standard versions of non-naturalist realism.

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Metasemantic expressivism and the question of realism (part 2)

In his 2004 paper “Meta-ethics and the problem of creeping minimalism,” Jamie Dreier argued that quasi-realism and realism diverge in their explanations of normative content: realists appeal to normative facts and properties when explaining what it is to have a normative belief or to make a normative claim, while expressivist explanations appeal instead to desire-like attitudes.

As I noted in my previous post, this “explanation” explanation of the divide between quasi-realism and realism seems to fit well with the new understanding of expressivism as a metasemantic view…

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